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10. The Issue of Uncertainty in 
Economics 
 
Sheila C. Dow* 
 
 
To teach how to live without certainty, and yet without being paralysed by 
hesitation, is perhaps the chief thing that philosophy, in our age, can still do 





Policy-makers are required to act, even if the action is a continuation of 
the status quo. The institutional structure within which monetary policy is 
made requires that a decision is taken at regular intervals as to the repo 
rate to be set by the central bank. This decision has to be taken on some 
grounds, and the focus here is on the grounds which economics provides. 
 It is clear that such decisions are not made under conditions of 
certainty. The Minutes of the Bank of England Monetary Policy 
Committee, for example, reveal that the arguments put forward by each 
member involve more or less uncertainty, but also that the arguments 
among all the members can be quite diverse. Indeed the Bank of 
England’s inflation forecast is expressed in the form of a ‘fan’, whose 
amplitude is a measure of uncertainty surrounding the core forecast. 
 That this uncertainty should be made so explicit, and so public, is an 
interesting development in itself, contrasting with such periods as the 
1980s when policy-making was made apparently with great confidence 
on the basis of large macro models. Experience showed that much of this 
confidence was misplaced. 
 But if we cannot be certain as to the outcome of policy actions, what is 
their justification? There is a long tradition of Austrian, or neo-Austrian, 
economics within which the scope for policy action is limited on the 
grounds that the knowledge base of policy-makers is insufficient, relative 
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to that of economic actors. Indeed the macroeconomic aggregates on 
which policy is designed to impinge are seen as having limited meaning. 
 The purpose of this chapter is to explore the concept of uncertainty 
and how it affects the foundations of policy-making in economics. We 
start by considering what we mean by uncertainty, and its source. We 
will consider first the distinction between uncertainty as a property of the 
real world, and uncertainty as a property of our knowledge about the real 
world. We then consider the distinction between uncertainty as a 
subjective concept and as an objective concept. Economic actors and 
their knowledge of the real world are the subject matter of economics; in 
the third section we consider their knowledge and uncertainty in relation 
to the knowledge and uncertainty of economists about them. We consider 
how both economists and economic actors can deal with uncertainty, 
introducing partial, provisional closures in order to construct knowledge 
about an open system. We conclude by taking further the explicit 
question of monetary policy-making under uncertainty. 
 
 
2. THE NATURE AND SOURCE OF UNCERTAINTY 
 
The term ‘uncertainty’ is being used here with a much broader meaning 
than is often the case in economics. By uncertainty we mean here 
unquantifiable risk, although quantifiable risk is often referred to in 
economics as uncertainty. If risk is quantifiable, we can insure against it. 
It is of limited interest because it allows the focus to continue to be on the 
core prediction. Of course greater quantifiable risk is relevant to 
decision-making, when the potential loss arising from outlying outcomes 
is taken into account. Indeed much of the monetary policy literature 
dating from Brainard (1967) and Poole (1970) has focused on the 
significance of higher variance in the error terms of equations 
representing the transmission of monetary policy. But much of the 
macroeconomics which provides the foundation for policy advice has 
effectively ignored the size of error variance; as long as the error term has 
zero mean and is normally distributed, the stochastic nature of the system 
can effectively be ignored, and certainty equivalence assumed. 
 Quantifiable risk has been the main focus of economics, rather than 
unquantifiable risk, because of the attractions of mathematical formalism 
(see Backhouse 1998, for a modified advocacy of this position, and 
Blaug 1999, for a historical account). But the possibility of 
unquantifiable risk needs to be addressed, not least because its existence 
is evident. Keynes introduced his Treatise on Probability (where he 
treated degrees of certainty and degrees of probability as equivalent) as 
follows: 
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In most branches of academic logic . . . all arguments aim at demonstrative 
certainty. They claim to be conclusive. But many other arguments are rational 
and claim some weight without pretending to be certain. In metaphysics, in 
science, and in conduct, most of the arguments, upon which we habitually 
base our rational beliefs, are admitted to be inconclusive in a greater or lesser 
degree. (Keynes [1921] 1973, p. 3, emphasis in original) 
 
Considering the source and extent of uncertainty gets to the heart of 
economics and its philosophical foundations. 
 Uncertainty is a property of knowledge. But a distinction is drawn in 
the literature regarding the source of uncertainty, that is, between aleatory 
and epistemic uncertainty (see Lawson 1988, for a full discussion). The 
former is uncertainty which arises from the nature of the real world, 
while the latter arises from our capacity to have knowledge about the real 
world. If there is randomness in nature, for example, so that an economy 
experiences random real shocks, then our knowledge of these shocks is 
inevitably incomplete, and therefore our ability to predict is limited 
accordingly. Randomness however is measurable and entails certain 
knowledge that shocks are random, so that this representation of aleatory 
uncertainty in fact corresponds to quantifiable risk. Aleatory uncertainty 
in the broader sense of unquantifiable risk is much less easy to pin down; 
we may not have any basis for knowing that the real world conforms to a 
stochastic system. 
 Epistemic uncertainty arises from an inability to know the real world. 
In the monetary policy literature, epistemic uncertainty can arise because 
of lags in the availability of data, or because of an inability to measure 
variables such as potential output (see Goodhart 1999). More generally, 
epistemic uncertainty understood as bounded rationality refers to 
limitations on the human ability to compute. The presumption is that in 
principle the economic structure and the mechanism for the transmission 
of monetary policy are knowable, but in practice we cannot fully access 
this knowledge. The implication of much of the discussion in the 
theoretical literature is that it is simply a matter of time before 
impediments to knowledge are overcome (see for example Blanchard and 
Fischer 1989, p. 505). The policy literature is less sanguine. This type of 
epistemic uncertainty is less amenable to capturing in a random error 
term, so the (policy-focused) model uncertainty literature has addressed 
this type of uncertainty by considering policy rules which are robust 
across a range of possible representations of the real world (see for 
example Bray et al. 1995). 
 But it may be that the nature of the real world is so complex that we 
cannot have full knowledge of it, even in principle; this may be one way 
of understanding the human condition. Indeed David Hume’s theory of 
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human nature involved this inevitable limitation on knowledge; this was 
the source of his (commonly misunderstood) problem of induction (Dow 
2002). Observation gives us clues to underlying causal mechanisms and 
we build knowledge as best we can, but we have no direct access to 
knowledge of these mechanisms. 
 Further, since human knowledge and action based on this knowledge 
are central to the real world of social systems, the distinction between 
aleatory and epistemic uncertainty becomes blurred. To pursue this idea, 
it is helpful to consider what the uncertainty is about. In most of the 
monetary policy literature the goal is to construct a model which 
represents the economic structure and the transmission of monetary 
policy within that structure. What cannot be pinned down is classified as 
uncertainty. If the structure the economist is trying to capture is 
stochastic, uncertainty is aleatory. If there are difficulties in pinning 
down the structure, uncertainty is epistemic. This classification presumes 
that the economic system is such that it can be captured in a model. If on 
the other hand the real world is complex and organic, with behavior and 
institutions evolving over time, sometimes gradually and sometimes with 
discrete shifts, then it cannot conceivably be fully captured in a model. 
Models will capture aspects of that complexity and thus add to 
knowledge. But that knowledge is inevitably partial and provisional. It is 
not just that there are limitations to human knowledge. These limitations 
are inevitable not only because of human failings, but also because of the 
nature of the real world about which we are trying to build up knowledge, 
and of which human nature is a central part. The creativity of individuals 
as well as the evolving social patterns of behavior mean that the 
economic structure changes in inevitably unpredictable ways. 
 It is helpful to recall Popper’s (1982) three-way classification of the 
universe: world 1 is the physical world, world 2 the psychological world, 
and world 3 the product of the human mind. The first two constitute one 
of the conventional understandings of the subject matter of economics to 
which the concept of aleatory uncertainty may be applied. World 3 is the 
province of epistemic uncertainty. But, as Popper argues, the three 
worlds are all interdependent, with human constructions being both the 
product of worlds 1 and 2, and in turn affecting them. Popper concluded 
that, taken together, the three worlds produce an indeterminate whole. 
The indeterminacy is not stochasticness, but a more profound 
indeterminacy which means that the universe is an open system. Once we 
understand the universe as an open system, according to Popper, it cannot 
be represented by a deterministic (even if stochastic) model. It is 
therefore no longer appropriate to talk in terms of the ‘true’ model about 
which we are uncertain. There is no such thing (other than hypothetically, 
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as something known by the deity). Epistemic uncertainty therefore 
follows from, and in turn contributes to, the openness of the real world. 
 A more appropriate distinction may then be between subjective 
uncertainty and objective uncertainty. Subjective uncertainty refers to the 
individual perceptions of the real world, and the different psychological 
states of different individuals. This can be distinguished from the degree 
of uncertainty which it is in some sense rational to hold with respect to a 
given body of knowledge. This distinction is important for the (neo-) 
Austrian approach to knowledge. Methodological individualism 
emphasizes the subjective. But the Austrian approach stems from a 
particular understanding of the nature of the real world as an open system 
(a particular ontology). It is therefore logically compatible with a less 
subjectivist approach which sees objective grounds for uncertainty 
arising from the openness of the economic system. There is a huge debate 
in the literature on this subject, not least about how to understand Keynes 
in relation to subjectivism and objectivism with respect to uncertainty 
(see for example Davis’s 1994 account). But in fact the focus on duals 
(such as objective/subjective) is itself more compatible with a closed-
system approach. By exploring an open systems approach here, we 
emphasize more the totality of uncertainty as arising from the openness 
of the real world, rather than dualistic categories (see further Dow 1990). 
 In order to function in this real world, individuals do build up 
knowledge, albeit uncertain knowledge. Indeed, it was central to 
Menger’s (1963) contribution that institutional arrangements evolve in 
order to provide a reasonably stable foundation for knowledge. So the 
economic structure itself is conditioned by knowledge limitations and 
attempts to surmount them. Similarly, the project of science can be 
understood as an exercise in reducing uncertainty about the real world, 
and in turn impacts upon the real world. Epistemic uncertainty and efforts 
to address it become bound up with the real economic structure and thus 
with sources of aleatory uncertainty. In the next section we focus on the 
parallelism between the efforts of economic actors to reduce uncertainty 
and the efforts of economists (see Dow 2003, for a fuller account). 
 
 
3. UNCERTAINTY OF ECONOMISTS AND UNCERTAINTY OF 
ECONOMIC ACTORS 
 
As a social science, economics is concerned with individual and social 
action, within social structures. Economists therefore aim to build up 
knowledge about this action and these structures. This provides the basis 
for policy action and the design of economic structures. But knowledge 
in turn can be understood to be central to both action and structures 
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within the economy, so that issues of uncertainty can be seen to impact 
both on the subject matter and on economic science. In the passage 
quoted above from Keynes’s Treatise on Probability, he clearly sees the 
issues as applying to science and to conduct. 
 Knowledge has been even more central to the Austrian understanding 
of the economic process. Drawing on this tradition and the Marshallian 
tradition, there is a large modern literature which sees knowledge at the 
core of economic reality. A key contributor to this literature, Brian 
Loasby, draws explicit parallels between the way in which knowledge is 
generated in the firm and in markets, and the way in which it is generated 
among economists (see for example Loasby 1999). He goes back (most 
recently in Loasby, forthcoming) to Smith in a way which resolves the 
objectivity/subjectivity dualism which has the potential to threaten a 
blending of the Austrian and Marshallian traditions. Drawing on Hume, 
Smith accepted that truth was not demonstrable. He turned therefore from 
a rational account of science to a psychological account, focusing on the 
motivation for science and the basis for reasoned persuasion to accept 
(provisionally) one account of reality over another. Although science was 
explained in psychological terms, it was not seen as subjective (as the 
dual of objective) since it was grounded first in a belief in the existence 
of the real, and second in practice (both scientific and non-scientific). 
Indeed, the methodological individualism of Austrian economics has 
accordingly recently been conditioned by its blending with evolutionary 
economics, such that individual behavior is seen as conditioned by pre-
existing institutions (see for example Caldwell and Boehm 1992). 
 Loasby (forthcoming) further explores the role of closed models in 
building up knowledge of an open reality. For firms, some closure is a 
necessary feature of knowledge as the basis for action; for example, 
planning requires some expectation as to the outcome of innovation 
(some closure in what we might think of as an inherently open process). 
The firm itself is a form of closure. Action is based, and institutions are 
designed, on the basis of the identification of patterns, of connections 
which are understood to be present as opposed to absent. The very notion 
of a system entails incomplete connectedness of reality. Similarly, as 
economists, we build theoretical systems on the basis of patterns which 
we understand to be present in nature. 
 A fixedly closed system precludes uncertainty (as opposed to 
quantifiable risk); it requires internal relations to be given, and external 
forces to be random. In reality a perpetually closed system is generally 
unsustainable; firms come and go, institutions evolve. Provisional closure 
is necessary for action, while perpetual attention to change from within 
and without leads to paralysis. Further, provisional closure itself reduces 
uncertainty for other actors. The existence of labor contracts, of posted 
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product prices, of stable institutions all serve as a set of patterns within 
which action can be taken. Periods of crisis are those where familiar 
patterns break down, uncertainty is rife, and paralysis sets in. 
 Chick and Dow (2001) argue that the methodology of employing 
partial, provisional closures in order to build up knowledge of an open 
reality allows for generality. It reflects the generality of uncertainty, 
while allowing different partial closures to reflect different contexts. 
Further, this kind of pluralist analysis may simultaneously employ 
different closures, even when addressing a single context. Thus one part 
of the analysis may take the money supply as given, while another part 
explores the process which determines the money supply. 
 The provisional closures within which actors make decisions in the 
economy can be thought of as models. They are human constructs which 
facilitate the economic process. When actors are uncertain they can be 
thought of as being uncertain about whether there is good reason to 
continue with the models they provisionally employ as the basis for 
action. There is apparently a direct parallel with the model uncertainty of 
economists. The critical issue however is what the uncertainty is about. 
We need to distinguish between uncertainty as to which is ‘the best 
model’ and uncertainty as to which is ‘the best collection of provisional, 
partial models’, that is between monism and pluralism. 
 The model uncertainty literature in general avoids this parallelism 
between economists’ knowledge and the knowledge of economic actors. 
The literature which assesses the relative merits of a given range of 
leading macroeconomic models makes no comment on the fact that these 
models depict individual economic actors as displaying no such 
uncertainty. Similarly, the Bank of England (1999), which in other 
respects is most outspoken on the need for pluralism as the basis for 
policy decisions, nevertheless employs models which presume certainty 
equivalence among economic actors. The major exception is work in 
which Sargent plays a leading part, such as Sargent (1999); he is 
concerned with symmetry of treatment between economist and agent. But 
to make agents’ uncertainty and the uncertainty of economists tractable, 
it is depicted for both as a complex stochastic process which is subject to 
pre-defined limits. What is expressed as uncertainty is in fact risk with 
respect to knowledge of the true model of the economic structure. 
 Keynes (1921) explicitly addressed the question of how individuals (in 
the economy, or economists, or whatever) establish reasoned grounds for 
belief such as to provide a basis for action; this found an echo later 
(Keynes 1937) when he encapsulated a key element of the General 
Theory, the theory of liquidity preference. In the absence of a true model 
which individuals or economists could aim to access, given the openness 
of the real world, no one best route to knowledge can be identified. 
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Action, according to Keynes, is based on reason (understood as rational 
grounds for belief), subject to a psychological force (intuition, animal 
spirits, and so on). Classical logic alone is insufficient to justify action 
since we cannot be certain of the outcome of our actions, far less the 
environment within which they will be played out. For Keynes, reason is 
instead based on ordinary logic, or human logic, which does not require 
certainty as to the truth or falsity of premises. 
 Ordinary logic, for economic actors and for economists, consists of 
multiple strands of reasoning, drawing on a range of sources of direct 
knowledge. Both actors and economists employ a pluralist methodology. 
Recourse is made to convention. In the absence of adequate knowledge 
derived from individualistic rationality, conventional knowledge is built 
up at a societal level. When forming expectations under uncertainty, 
individuals use what individual knowledge they have, but also refer to 
expert sources and indicators of societal expectations. The framework 
within which knowledge is formed and action taken is a set of 
conventions and institutions built up over the years in response to the 
need to cope with uncertainty, ranging from the rule of law to 
conventional market behavior. But by the same token expectations, 
lacking a rationalistic foundation, are subject to periodic discrete shifts. A 
change in conventional understanding, due for example to a highly 
publicized event, or an expression of a new expectation by a leading 
pundit, can have widespread consequences for expectations, for the 
degree of uncertainty with which they are generally held, and for ensuing 
action. 
 The same is true of economists. One of the major insights of Kuhn’s 
(1962) approach, taken forward by the sociology of scientific knowledge, 
or science studies, is that scientific communities’ normal research is built 
on a conventional foundation shared by the members of the community. 
The modern rhetoric approach, echoing Smith’s theory of rhetoric, 
focuses on what is conventionally persuasive in the presentation of new 
ideas. Further, these conventions are embedded in an institutional 
structure set up to provide a basis for scientific activity: journals, 
textbooks, conferences, and so on. Were scientific knowledge not subject 
to uncertainty then rationalistic arguments could compete in a world akin 
to perfect competition. But, just as that world is impractical for markets 
in general in a world of uncertainty – markets require conventional 
behavior and institutions in order to function – so too scientific 
communities require some underpinning. This introduces some closure 
which allows science to proceed. But there is an inevitable circularity in 
the conceptual framework conventionally adopted by a particular 
community or paradigm, the way it understands the economic system, 
and the way it understands arguments about that system (see Loasby 
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2002). A fixed closure is unsustainable and science is subject to paradigm 
shifts just as conventional expectations are subject to discrete shifts. 
Economic paradigms do evolve over time, responding to experience of 
reality which challenges a particular choice of closure. 
 Monetary policy provides an excellent example of such a challenge. 
We turn in the next section to consider where this discussion takes us in 
considering the methodological foundations for monetary policy. 
 
 
4. UNCERTAINTY AND MONETARY POLICY 
 
The conventional closure involved in basing policy on one large macro 
model, treated as the ‘true’ model, was confronted by the experience of 
predictive failure (see for example Clements and Hendry 1995). One 
response has been the Bank of England’s (1999) professed embracing of 
pluralism (although there is still an emphasis on one core macro model). 
 The 1980s can be understood as a period in which policy was based on 
a form of humanism. There was optimism that the large macro models 
provided an adequate guide to policy action, which could be expected to 
yield the predicted outcomes. This optimism was gradually punctured 
when these expectations were confounded. The prevailing paradigm of 
New Classical Economics had relied on certainty equivalence on the part 
of economic actors and economists alike. Within this paradigm, there 
emerged the Lucas critique which challenged one of the closures within 
the model structure: that behavior was invariant in the face of policy 
action. Lucas (1976) argued that rational individuals in fact respond to 
policy action in such a way as to make it impotent. The conclusion was 
that policy action could only have an impact on the economy if it was 
random, that is there was no point in policy action. 
 This conclusion found support from a line of argument which took a 
very different starting-point. Far from individuals and economists 
knowing too much, the problem with policy action might derive from 
unknowability resulting from radical uncertainty. Thus Hayek, for 
example, expressed the radical uncertainty of the Austrian approach as 
grounds for an argument against humanism: 
 
If man is not to do more harm than good in his efforts to improve the social 
order, he will have to learn that . . . where essential complexity of an 
organised kind prevails, he cannot acquire the full knowledge which would 
make mastery of the events possible. He will therefore have to use what 
knowledge he can achieve, not to shape the results as a craftsman shapes his 
handiwork, but rather to cultivate a growth by providing the appropriate 
environment, as the gardener does for his plants. (Hayek 1975, p. 42, 
emphasis in original) 
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This argument attracted support from a wide range of perspectives which 
were influenced by the emergence of postmodernism, which more 
generally challenged humanism. Thus for example, while starting from a 
closed-system theoretical perspective based on certainty-equivalence like 
Lucas, Hahn (1983) denied the empirical validity of the New Classical 
approach – the knowledge requirements could not in practice be met. 
Like those coming from a radical uncertainty perspective, Hahn therefore 
raised questions as to how policy intervention could be justified. 
 The Keynes uncertainty approach is aimed more at a middle ground 
(an argument developed in detail by O’Donnell 1989). Uncertainty itself 
justifies government intervention, since it can serve to provide an 
element of stability for economic actors. O’Donnell explains this role in 
terms of knowledge and institutions: 
 
State activity was thus a precondition of successful individualism, improving 
the efficiency of resource utilisation and eliminating some of the hazards of 
pure laissez-faire. By attacking remediable sources of uncertainty, providing 
data banks and by reforming institutions, it could improve the environment in 
which individual rationality was exercised. (O’Donnell 1989, p. 303, 
emphasis in original) 
 
The role is extended by the content of Keynesian fiscal and monetary 
policy – both are designed to provide a sound basis for investment; in the 
case of fiscal policy the government may actively intervene by engaging 
in its own capital projects to increase aggregate demand. 
 The implementation of this policy arguably was so successful that the 
relative stability of the 1950s and 1960s encouraged inattention to issues 
of uncertainty and expectations. The neo-classical synthesis of that period 
ignored these central features of Keynes’s economic theory. This 
coincided with a high level of confidence in the capacity of the state to 
manage the economy and a continuation of closures in theorizing which 
became increasingly untenable, leading to the New Classical revolution. 
 There has been a dualistic swing away from humanism, but now a 
return to seek out some middle ground. Central banks, including the 
ECB, are addressing methodological issues as they grapple with the 
uncertainty of their knowledge in the face of the requirement to act. This 
is a time of rather uncomfortable transition, as old closures (such as 
certainty-equivalence on the part of economic agents) bump up against 
the actual uncertainty of policy-makers. The Bank of England has taken a 
lead by pointing to pluralism as the methodological route to follow. But 
much needs to be done to spell out what that entails for how the 
knowledge foundations of monetary policy are constructed. 
 





We have addressed here the fundamental issues raised for economics by a 
consideration of uncertainty in its broadest sense. These issues get to the 
heart of what it is that we do as economists, as well as what we do as 
economic actors. There is a danger of falling into one or the other of two 
sharp categories with respect to knowledge: the certainty equivalence of 
closed-system models on the one hand and the radical uncertainty of 
completely open systems on the other. Both inhibit policy action. But by 
considering the middle ground where some closures are introduced (by 
individuals, by social institutions, by government, by theorists) in order 
to reduce uncertainty, we can see how social structures do manage to 
function in spite of uncertainty, and how actions to affect behavior and 
institutional design may serve to reduce uncertainty. 
 The methodological approach implied by this middle-ground is a form 
of pluralism – not ‘anything goes’, but a recourse to a range of methods 
and types of knowledge suited to the problem at hand and the type of 
economic structure within which it is understood to occur. This seems to 
be what central bankers tend to do anyway, being closer to the real world 
and more compelled to action than academic economists. But there is still 
an uncomfortable juxtaposition between this practice and the approach 
which is often professed by central bankers as well as academics: 
modeling which is closed-system in a fixed way, rather than in the 
partial, provisional way of the pluralist approach. A fundamental rethink 
at the methodological level is required to produce an approach to the 
knowledge base of policy which is philosophically consistent in a world 
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